Tag Archives: Charles G. Moore

Part 49 – 2012 Report Of Congressional Research Service Suggests @USTransitionTax May Be Unconstitutionally Retroactive

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Introduction and purpose

In an earlier post I argued that in the Moore appeal the Supreme Court should consider the retroactive nature of the MRT AKA transition tax. My argument was based my interpreting the law to be that retroactive legislation might be unconstitutional if it:

1. Was retroactive for an extensive period of time (in this case the period of retroactivity was 31 years); and

2. Was new legislation

After writing that post, I came across this 2012 Congressional Research Report which suggests that tax legislation could be unconstitutionally retroactive based on the same two principles.

A relevant excerpt from the report follows.

The 2012 Congressional Research Report: CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Constitutionality of Retroactive Tax Legislation

The following excerpt is of interest and relevance to the Moore appeal

Period of Retroactivity

The most common potential concern with respect to substantive due process is the length of the retroactivity. The Supreme Court has made clear that a modest retroactive application of tax laws is permissible, describing it as a “customary congressional practice” required by “the practicalities of producing national legislation.”9 As a result, tax legislation that is retroactive to the beginning of the year of enactment has routinely been upheld against due process challenges.10 There does not seem to be any serious question as to whether such a period of retroactivity is constitutional.

What then happens with periods of application that go beyond the year of enactment? The Court has upheld several tax laws where the period of retroactivity extended into the preceding calendar year.11 For example, in United States v. Carlton, the Court upheld the retroactive application of a federal estate tax provision that limited the availability of a recently added deduction for the proceeds of sales of stock to employee stock ownership plans. The deduction was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which had not included a requirement that the taxpayer own the stock immediately prior to death. The lack of such a requirement essentially created a loophole that Congress fixed with the 1987 amendment. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was enacted in October 1986, and the amendment was enacted in December 1987, to apply as if incorporated in the 1986 law. In upholding the 1987 law, the Court explained that the period of retroactivity was permissible since it was only slightly more than one year, as well as noting that the IRS had announced its concern with the original law as early as January 1987 and a bill to make the correction was introduced in Congress the very next month.12

However, it does appear that due process concerns may be raised by a more extended period of retroactivity. In Nichols v. Coolidge (one of the few cases where the Supreme Court struck down a retroactive tax on due process grounds),13 the Court disallowed the retroactive application of an estate tax provision that changed the tax treatment of a transfer 12 years after the transfer had occurred.14 The Court later unfavorably compared the 12-year period with periods where the “retroactive effect is limited.”15 This suggests that due process concerns are raised by an extended period of retroactivity. However, it is not clear how long a period might be constitutionally problematic. The Court has recognized retroactive liability for periods beyond one or two years in non-taxation contexts,16 but it is not clear how a similar situation arising under the tax laws would be addressed.

Reliance and Lack of Notice

One issue often raised is that it may seem unfair to change the tax laws once a taxpayer has done something based on the law as it existed at the time. The fact that taxpayers may have concluded a transaction in reliance on prior law is generally not important to the analysis as “reliance alone is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”17 As the Court has made clear, “[t]ax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code.”18 In other words,

Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process….19

Additionally, lack of notice of the retroactive effect of a tax law is not dispositive of whether due process has been violated.20 Lack of notice may, nonetheless, be a concern when the retroactive legislation enacts a wholly new tax. This was the issue in two cases where the Court struck down retroactive tax legislation on due process grounds—Blodgett v. Holden and Untermyer v. Anderson.21 Both dealt with the constitutionality of retroactive application of the Revenue Act of 1924, which enacted the gift tax. The legislation was introduced in February 1924, enacted that June, and applied to gifts made after January 1, 1924. The taxpayer in Blodgett made a gift in January 1924, and the taxpayer in Untermyer made a gift in May 1924, while the bill was in conference. The plurality in Blodgett and the majority in Untermyer held the retroactive application was unconstitutional because it was arbitrary as the taxpayers made gifts without knowing they would subsequently be subject to tax.22 In such a situation, a taxpayer has “no reason to suppose that any transactions of the sort will be taxed at all.”23

The Court in later cases has clearly distinguished the two cases on the basis that they dealt with the “creation of a wholly new tax” and therefore “their authority is of limited value in assessing the constitutionality of subsequent amendments that bring about certain changes in operation of the tax laws.”24 Thus, while lack of notice is not dispositive, the Court has suggested that lack of notice may violate due process if the retroactive law creates a “wholly new tax.”

Since the two cases dealing with the creation of the gift tax, it does not appear the Court has found any other situations where lack of notice was an issue.25 In some instances, the Court determined the retroactive tax provision was not a wholly new tax, as with the provision in Carlton, which amended a new estate tax deduction that was enacted 14 months prior as part of a major overhaul of the tax code.26 Even in a case with what looked like a brand new tax—a tax on silver under the Silver Purchase Act—the Court upheld a 35-day period of retroactivity.27 In that case, the law was enacted on June 19, 1934, retroactive back to May 15, 1934. In upholding the law’s retroactive application, the Court suggested that taxpayers had sufficient notice since there had been pressure for legislation for months, the President had sent a message to Congress encouraging such a tax on May 15, and the bill that became the act was introduced on May 23. This suggests that it would be rare for a tax provision to be characterized as a “wholly new tax” so long as taxpayers were on some kind of notice that a tax might be imposed.

The full report is available here:

https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R42791.pdf

A pdf of the full report is here:

Retroactive Tax R42791

Interested in Moore about the § 965 transition tax?

Read “The Little Red Transition Tax Book“.

John Richardson – Follow me on Twitter @Expatriationlaw

Part 50 – Moore: The Government And The Tax Academics Strike Back

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Introduction

The U.S. Supreme Court will hear the case of Charles G. Moore v. United States on December 5, 2023. It is certain to be the most closely watched oral argument ever. I had originally considered travelling to DC to observe the spectacle in person. But, I have no desire to stand in a long line. I will have to settle for listening to audio online.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-800.html

The government’s reply was filed on October 16, 2023. It has been supported by (so far) a relatively small number of amicus briefs from various tax academics (law professors). The purpose of this post is to offer my impressions of what I have read so far. There is a saying that two good trial lawyers are like two ships passing in the night (each with a different theory of the case). This is also descriptive of the briefs (collectively) in support of the Moores and the briefs (collectively) in support of the government.

Outline

Part A – A Review – What is the Moore case actually about?
Part B – Some preliminary questions – in the context of understanding the 16th amendment:
Part C – The government’s reply and the “tax academic” supporters are notable in that they:
Part D – An attempt to consolidate what the government and tax profs are saying …
Part E – Retroactivity – An Uncomfortable Truth
Appendix – The Tax Law Center

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Part 43 – The 1996 Treasury Regs, 2017 TCJA And The Looting Of Canadian Controlled Private Corporations

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Punishing U.S. citizens who live outside the United States As Tax Residents Of Canada

The deadline for the submission of Amicus briefs in the Moore MRT appeal is rapidly approaching. As a result (partly by accident and partly by design) I have been rethinking a number of concepts including Subpart F generally, the 965 Transition Tax specifically, retroactivity in the context of the transition tax and (of course) the injustice inflicted by the U.S. “citizenship taxation” regime on dual Canada/US citizens who are resident in Canada. I just realized something that although obvious has not (to my knowledge) been discussed.

Bottom line: US citizens living in Canada who are subject to the 965 MRT AKA transition tax are (as individual shareholders of Canadian Controlled Private Corporations) subject to a tax that a U.S. citizen residing in the United States could NEVER be subject to!! Putting it another way: The U.S. citizen living in Canada is subject to a tax based on an activity (being a shareholder of a Canadian Controlled Private Corp) that a U.S. resident is not eligible to do. A U.S. citizen living in the United States is simply not eligible to be a shareholder of a Canadian Controlled Private Corporation that is a “Controlled Foreign Corporation”. A U.S. living in Canada is eligible to be a shareholder in a Canadian Controlled Private Corporation. Therefore, a Canadian resident is subject to the 965 transition tax with respect to a corporation that – vis-a-vis a U.S. resident – can never be a Controlled Foreign Corporation.

On the one hand this is clearly an abuse of U.S. citizens living in Canada (because of the U.S. citizenship tax regime) AND an attack on the Canadian tax base. On the other hand (as this post will demonstrate):

“It’s the American way!”

Part A – Prologue 1996: Treasury Creates The Legal Structure To Facilitate The 2017 Looting Of Canadian Controlled Private Corporations

America is obsessed with its corporations. The primary purpose of the 2017 TCJA was to lower the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%. Individuals have a “love hate” relationship with Corporations. A country’s tax code is a reflection of the country’s values. The U.S. Internal Revenue Code has a hatred of “all things foreign”. But, nowhere is this hatred reflected more in the treatment of “foreign corporations” (think Subpart F, GILTI, transition tax and PFIC). Given the importance of corporations in U.S. culture and taxation, one would expect the Internal Revenue Code would define “corporation”. Shockingly it does not! The kinds of activities that are to be treated as corporations (unless there is an “opt out”) are defined NOT in the Internal Revenue Code, but in the Treasury Regulations – specifically the entity classification rules found in the 7701 entity classification regulations. These regulations were last subject to significant modification in 1996. The regulations created a class of entities that are called “**per se corporations”. A “per se corporation” is always treated as a “corporation”. This means that if they are “foreign corporations” they are always potentially subject to both the Subpart F and PFIC regimes. Notably almost ALL categories of Canadian corporations (including *Canadian Controlled Private Corporations) are treated as “per se” corporations. Because Canadian Controlled Private Corporations are deemed to be “per se corporations” they were “sitting ducks” for the 2017 TCJA changes – specifically GILT and the 965 Transition Tax.

In an earlier discussion how the 7701 Treasury entity classification regulations deemed Canadian Controlled Private Corporations to be “per se” corporations, I noted that:

Canadian corporations should NOT be deemed (under the Treasury entity classification regulations) to be “per se” corporations. The reality is that corporations play different roles in different tax and business cultures. Corporations in Canada have many uses and purposes, including operating as private pension plans for small business owners (including medical professionals).

Deeming Canadian corporations to be “per se” corporations means that they are always treated as “foreign corporations” for the purposes of US tax rules. This has resulted in their being treated as CFCs or as PFICs in circumstances which do not align with the purpose of the CFC and PFIC rules.

The 2017 965 Transition Tax confiscated the pensions of a large numbers of Canadian residents. The ongoing GILTI rules have made it very difficult for small business corporations to be used for their intended purposes in Canada.

Clearly Treasury deemed Canadian Controlled Private Corporations to be “per se” corporations without:

1. Understanding the use and role of these corporations in Canada; and

2. Assuming that ONLY US residents might be shareholders in Canadian corporations. As usual, the lives of US citizens living outside the United States were not considered.

These are the problems that inevitably arise under the US citizenship-based AKA extraterritorial tax regime, coupled with a lack of sensitivity to how these rules impact Americans abroad. The US citizenship-based AKA extraterritorial tax regime may be defined as:

The United States imposing worldwide taxation on the non-US source income of people who are tax residents of other countries and do not live in the United States!

It is imperative that the United States transition to a system of pure residence-based taxation!

Conclusion: The 1996 Treasury regulations deemed Canadian Controlled Private Corporations to be per se foreign corporations. Because they were deemed to be corporations this meant that they their “U.S. Shareholders” were subject to the Subpart F regime. Being subject to the Subpart F regime was both a necessary and sufficient condition for the 2017 looting of the retained earnings of those corporations through the 2017 965 MRT AKA transition tax.

Part B – The applicability of Subpart F, GILTI and the Transition Tax to “Canadian Controlled Private Corporations”

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Part 39 – The § 965 Transition Tax: Congress Said: “Let There Be Income And There Was Income”

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Outline

Part A – Prologue And Introduction
Part B – A wealth tax may NOT be a 16th Amendment income tax
Part C – The identification of existing income, new income and retroactivity
Part D – “Deferred income”: A newly created form of income or previously existing income exempt from taxation
Part E – The Moore’s visit the Supreme Court Of The United States – The Government’s Response
Part F – Conclusion

Part A – Prologue And Introduction

The Moore transition tax appeal is about whether “income” under the 16th Amendment requires “realization” in order to qualify as income. Resolution of this issue requires an analysis of both the meaning of “income” (whatever “income” may mean) and whether “income” must be “realized” to meet constitutional requirements. Generally, the taxation of income receives its constitutional legitimacy because of the 16th amendment which reads:

The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”

The 16th Amendment (1) creates the constitutional jurisdiction for Congress to tax “incomes” but (2) extends the constitutional jurisdiction to tax, ONLY to “income”.

The 16th Amendment does NOT say that Congress has the power to collect taxes on anything that Congress decides to designate as income. Rather the 16th Amendment specifies a tax on “income”. In this respect, the 16th Amendment implies that there are limitations on the kinds of “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion” (or other events) that qualify as income. Something must have some objective characteristics in order to qualify as “income”. Perhaps an “event”. Perhaps an “accession to wealth”. Perhaps “realization”. Perhaps something else.

Income must meet some necessary and objective requirements

The word “income” (difficult as it may be to define) must have some “objective” limitation. Absent an “objective” limitation, Congress could simply “designate” anything as income and then impose taxation on it. Specifically legislating something as income is neither a necessary (See IRC § 61) nor sufficient condition (possibly the 965 transition tax) for something to objectively qualify as income. (That said, there are some who believe that there are no constitutional limitations on what Congress may define as income.)

Income must have some objective meaning and some objective limitation.

In summary:

To be taxable under the 16th Amendment, something must qualify as income.

Although income may not be possible to define with precision and certainty, there are certain things that clearly are NOT income.

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Part 38 – The § 965 Transition Tax Caused The Moore’s To Pay $14,712 Moore In Double Taxation

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In my last post I discussed the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear the Moore’s challenge to the 965 Transition Tax.

A direct link to the Supreme Court site which will track the progress and filings of all briefs (including what are expected to be a large number of amicus briefs) is here.

Although the 965 Transition Tax was the fact that prompted the litigation, the issue as framed for the Supreme Court was:

22-800 MOORE V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 36 F.4TH 930
CERT. GRANTED 6/26/2023

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to lay “taxes on incomes … without apportionment among the several States.” Beginning with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), this Court’s decisions have uniformly held “income,” for Sixteenth Amendment purposes, to require realization by the taxpayer. In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit approved taxation of a married couple on earnings that they undisputedly did not realize but were instead retained and reinvested by a corporation in which they are minority shareholders. It held that “realization of income is not a constitutional requirement” for Congress to lay an “income” tax exempt from apportionment. App.12. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit became “the first court in the country to state that an ‘income tax’ doesn’t require that a ‘taxpayer has realized income.”‘ App.38 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

The question presented is:

Whether the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 20-36122

The relevant facts as recited in the petition may be found in the Appendix* below.

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Part 33 – US residents bring suit alleging that the Section 965 US Transition Tax is Unconstitutional

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A lawsuit alleging that the Section 965 transition tax is unconstitutional affords the opportunity to write Part 33 in my series of posts about the U.S. Transition Tax.

Part 22 of this series included a discussion of a paper by Sean P. McElroy which argued that the Section 965 repatriation tax was unconstitutional for the following reasons explained in the abstract:

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